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WHY COUNTING VOTES DOESN’T ADD UP: 
A RESPONSE TO COX AND MILES’ JUDGING THE VOTING 
RIGHTS ACT 
Ellen D. Katz∗ 
Anna Baldwin∗∗ 
  
In Judging the Voting Rights Act, Professors Adam B. Cox and Thomas 
J. Miles report that judges are more likely to find liability under section 2 
of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) when they are African American, 
appointed by a Democratic president, or sit on an appellate panel with a 
judge who is African American or a Democratic appointee.  Cox and 
Miles posit that their findings “contrast” and “cast doubt” on much of 
the “conventional wisdom” about the Voting Rights Act,1 by which they 
mean the core findings we reported in Documenting Discrimination in 
Voting:  Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 
1982,2 and a related study by one of us, Not Like the South?:  Regional 
Variation and Political Participation Through the Lens of Section 2.3 
This assertion is puzzling given that Cox and Miles’ findings do not 
conflict or cast doubt on ours.  Our studies found that obstacles to 
minority political participation remain more prevalent in “covered” 
jurisdictions (i.e. places that, under section 5 of the VRA, must obtain 
approval from federal officials before changing their voting laws and 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.  Thanks to Emma Cheuse, 
Daniel Halberstam, Bill Miller, J.J. Prescott, Scott Shapiro, Mark West, and Chris Whitman 
for comments, and to Charles Doriean for statistical work.  
** J.D., Mich. 2006. 
1. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1, 5 (2008).   
2. Ellen D. Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting:  Judicial Findings 
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, Final Report of the Voting Rights 
Initiative, 39 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 643 (2006), available at  
http://sitemaker.umich.edu/votingrights/files/finalreport.pdf [hereinafter Katz et al., 
Documenting Discrimination].
 
3. Ellen D. Katz, Not Like the South? Regional Variation and Political Participation 
Through the Lens of Section 2, in Voting Rights Act Reauthorization of 2006:  
Perspectives on Democracy, Participation and Power 183–221 (A. Henderson ed., 2007), 
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/centers/ewi-old/research/votingrights/vra/ 
ch%208%20katz%203-9-07.pdf [hereinafter Katz, Not Like the South].  
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procedures) than in non-covered regions.4  We found that plaintiffs 
bringing section 2 claims have been more likely to succeed, and courts 
hearing these claims more likely to document a history of official 
discrimination, extreme racial polarization in voting, and a lack of 
success by minority candidates in covered jurisdictions than in non-
covered ones.5  These findings bolster the argument that the need for 
preclearance persists and support Congress’s 2006 decision to 
reauthorize section 5. 
Cox and Miles do not dispute our finding that section 2 plaintiffs 
have been more likely to prevail in covered jurisdictions than elsewhere.  
Nor do they contest our finding that courts hearing section 2 claims in 
covered jurisdictions have been more likely to make certain subsidiary 
findings—such as finding extreme racial polarization in voting and a 
lack of minority electoral success—than were courts in non-covered 
jurisdictions.  Cox and Miles do not focus on section 2 judgments or the 
findings underlying these judgments, and instead direct their attention 
to the varied votes individual judges cast in the course of section 2 
litigation.  Using this lens, they observe that the individual votes judges 
cast in section 2 cases in covered jurisdictions were no more likely to 
favor liability than the votes they cast in non-covered ones.  Based on this 
observation, Cox and Miles conclude that coverage does not matter.6 
The observation about votes is correct but the conclusion is not.  To 
be sure, the votes Cox and Miles counted do not, standing alone, show 
that covered jurisdictions “still have more voting rights problems” than 
non-covered ones.7  But no good reason exists to suspect that they would.  
Counting votes by individual judges rather than examining final 
judgments may well illuminate a number of issues, but as a lens through 
which to compare covered and non-covered jurisdictions, counting votes 
promises at best a skewed vision of “voting rights problems” in these 
regions. 
Votes and Judgments:  Lawsuits challenging electoral practices under 
section 2 might produce a single liability-stage vote, three such votes if 
heard by a three-judge trial court, or four or more such votes, depending 
on the nature of the appeals that follow an initial judgment.  An 
appellate court unanimously affirming a trial judge’s violation vote 
might signal a particularly egregious underlying practice, or it might 
represent a close call affirmed based on the standard of appellate review.  
An unappealed trial judge violation vote might represent a violation so 
 
4. See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 2, at 655–56; Katz, Not 
Like the South, supra note 3, at 187, 210–13.   
5. See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 2, at 655–56; Katz, Not 
Like the South, supra note 3, passim. 
6. See Cox & Miles, supra note 1, at 5, 47 (arguing that coverage “is not a strong 
predictor of liability in most section 2 cases,” and that the “estimated impact of section 5 
coverage is small . . . and statistically insignificant”). 
7. See id. at 5.   
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patent that appeal would have been futile, and yet it yields but one vote 
compared with the four produced by a closer case affirmed on appeal.  
The mere number of votes a lawsuit generates tells us nothing definitive 
about the nature of the underlying practice or the region in which it 
operated. 
Judging the Voting Rights Act finds that some judges were more likely 
to find liability than others.  In particular, Cox and Miles find that 
African American and Democratic judges were more likely to favor 
liability than their white and Republican colleagues.  These proclivities, 
however, do not render the observed effect of coverage a mere 
byproduct of race and party affiliation.  That is, they do not explain the 
greater proportion of successful section 2 claims found in covered 
jurisdictions.  Race and party could have such explanatory power only if 
the judges most likely to favor liability were disproportionately located in 
the covered regions.  But Professors Cox and Miles do not argue that 
they are so concentrated, and, in fact, they are not.8   
Trials and Appeals:  Judging the Voting Rights Act reports that trial 
judges were more likely to vote for liability in covered jurisdictions than 
in non-covered ones, but that appellate judges were not.  Cox and Miles 
seem to think that the difference they observed between trial level and 
appellate votes is noteworthy, that it offers a “contrast” with our 
findings, and reveals “complexity” and “nuance” our studies did not 
acknowledge.  But no contrast or unexpected complexity is operating 
here. 
To the extent that minority voters confront greater obstacles in 
covered jurisdictions, one might perhaps reflexively assume that judges 
at all levels would be more likely to cast votes for liability than their 
counterparts in non-covered jurisdictions.  But appellate judges differ 
from trial judges in important ways.  Trial judges are fact finders.  Insofar 
as minority voters confront greater or distinct obstacles to equal political 
participation in covered jurisdictions, trial judges adjudicating claims in 
these jurisdictions might well be more likely to make factual findings to 
that effect and to reach judgments based on these facts than would trial 
judges in non-covered regions.  Judging the Voting Rights Act suggests that 
trial judges may have done just that. 
Opportunities for appellate judges to cast liability-stage votes hinge 
 
8. African American judges cast 6.4%, or 16, of the 251 votes cast in covered 
jurisdictions, and 6.1%, or 19, of the 310 votes cast in non-covered jurisdictions.  
Democratic judges cast 41.8%, or 105, of the 251 votes in covered jurisdictions, and 
43.2%, or 134, of 310 votes in non-covered regions.  These proportions are statistically 
equivalent.  See infra Table 1.  
  Among trial judges, Democratic appointees cast 41.9%, or 39 of the 93 trial votes cast 
in covered jurisdictions, compared with 44.2%, or 69 of 156 votes in non-covered regions, 
and African American judges cast 8.6%, or 8 of the 93 covered trial votes, compared with 
5.8%, or 9 of the 156 votes in non-covered jurisdictions.  These proportions are 
statistically equivalent.  See infra Table 1.1. 
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on a host of factors not tied directly to coverage or its absence.  For 
example, fifty-six trial votes produced no published appellate opinion.  
To the extent that trial judgments most vulnerable to challenge are the 
ones in fact appealed, appealing these fifty-six votes would plausibly have 
yielded three additional votes affirming the underlying vote in each case.  
Had these appeals materialized, covered jurisdictions would account for 
a greater proportion of appellate votes finding liability than non-covered 
regions.9  That these appeals did not materialize hardly suggests that 
covered jurisdictions have fewer voting rights problems than non-
covered ones.  Instead, it highlights why the number of appellate votes 
cast in a case reveals little about the underlying claim and the region in 
which it originated.10 
 Affirmances and Reversals:  Counting and examining votes rather than 
judgments nevertheless reveals two insights about the Voting Rights Act 
that Cox and Miles do not discuss.  First, examining appellate votes to 
affirm or reverse suggests that minority voters confront obstacles of even 
greater severity and scope in covered jurisdictions than our original 
studies suggest.  Appellate courts in covered jurisdictions were both 
more likely to reverse denials of liability and less likely to reverse 
violations than were courts in non-covered regions.11  In other words, 
defendants were more likely to win on appeal in non-covered regions, 
while plaintiff-appeals were more likely to succeed in covered regions.  
This suggests that trial judges in covered jurisdictions, if anything, 
appear to have read section 2 too restrictively, and that the violations 
identified in covered regions are more clear and less vulnerable to 
challenge than those found elsewhere. 
The Number of Votes:  Examining section 2 votes rather than 
judgments also offers a means to assess section 5’s deterrent effect in 
 
9. Thirty-five of the 56 unappealed individual trial votes found a section 2 violation, 
22 of which came from covered jurisdictions, 13 from non-covered.  Translating these 
votes into appellate affirmances adds 66 additional appellate votes finding liability in 
covered regions, and 39 in non-covered.  Translating the 21 unappealed trial votes that 
found no violation into appellate affirmances adds 33 votes against liability in non-covered 
regions, and 30 in covered.  Adding these votes to the tally would mean that 43.7% of the 
appellate votes cast in covered jurisdictions would have favored liability, compared with 
38.5% in non-covered jurisdictions. 
10.  Our claim here is not, as Cox and Miles believe, that they “were wrong” to count 
appellate votes in their study on judicial propensities.  See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. 
Miles, Documenting Discrimination?, 108 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 31, 33 (2008), 
http://www.columbialawreview.org/Sidebar/volume/108/31_CoxMiles.pdf.  Instead, we 
take issue with the use Cox and Miles makes of the count they produced.  Simply put, 
there is no reason to assume that tallying appellate votes on  liability will produce the 
same liability patterns observed when counting votes by trial judges, or, more  
importantly, that it will mirror the proportion of overall judgments that find liability under 
section 2.  Our claim has consistently been that these judgments, and the findings that 
support them, matter far more that the number of times individual judges happen to cast 
liability votes in the course of a section 2 lawsuit. 
11. See infra Table 2. 
2008] WHY COUNTING VOTES DOESN’T ADD UP 27 
covered jurisdictions.  Judges cast many more votes in non-covered 
jurisdictions than in covered ones.  They have done so because three-
judge trial panels decided more than four times as many section 2 cases 
in non-covered jurisdictions than in covered ones.12  Three-judge trial 
panels are convened to hear challenges to the constitutionality of 
statewide or congressional apportionment plans, and such challenges 
were linked more often with section 2 claims in non-covered 
jurisdictions.  These challenges materialized more often in non-covered 
jurisdictions precisely because section 5 does not operate in these 
regions. 
Only covered jurisdictions must obtain federal approval or 
preclearance before implementing electoral changes.  This requirement 
has blocked implementation of numerous electoral practices in covered 
regions, and thus eliminated the need for plaintiffs to challenge these 
practices under section 2. 
For example, since 1982, the Justice Department has denied 
preclearance to dozens of districting plans of the type that, if challenged 
under section 2, would have been most likely to be heard by a three-
judge panel.13  Covered jurisdictions adjusted many others in order to 
meet the section 5 hurdle,14 which had been interpreted until 1997 to 
require that all proposed changes comply with section 2.15  As a result, 
section 5 objections and adjustments made in anticipation of such 
objections vastly reduced the likelihood that separate section 2 
challenges would follow.16  No such screening occurred in non-covered 
jurisdictions; hence many more three-judge trial panels were convened. 
Section 5’s screening effect produced the lopsided number of votes 
cast by three-judge panels in non-covered jurisdictions, and, more 
generally, the disproportionate number of votes cast in non-covered 
regions.  All else being equal, proportionally fewer section 2 violations 
should be found in covered jurisdictions than in non-covered ones 
 
12. See infra Tables 1, 3.  
13. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, About Section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act (Jan. 2, 2008), at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/obj_activ.htm (listing objections to various 
redistricting plans by state, including 1 objection in Alabama, 1 in Arkansas, 1 in Arizona, 
2 in Florida, 4 in Georgia, 2 in Mississippi, 1 in New Mexico, 2 in New York, 2 in North 
Carolina, 1 in South Carolina, 2 in Texas, and 2 in Virginia).   
14. See Luis Ricardo Fraga & Maria Lizet Ocampo, More Information Requests and 
the Deterrent Effect of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization of 2006, supra note 3, at 47, 56; Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared:  
Congressional Power to Extend and Amend the Voting Rights Act, 44 Houston L. Rev. 1, 
23–24 (2007). 
 15. Ellen D. Katz, Mission Accomplished?, 117 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 142 (2007),  at 
http://thepocketpart.org/2007/12/10/katz.html [hereinafter Katz, Mission 
Accomplished?].  
16. See Ellen D. Katz, Congressional Power to Extend Preclearance:  A Response to 
Professor Karlan, 44 Hous. L. Rev. 33, 37 n.12 (2007); see also Karlan, supra note 15, at 
31; Katz, Not Like the South, supra note 3, at 209–10 & nn.128, 135.   
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where, by definition, preclearance does not operate.  But this is not the 
case.17  Section 2 plaintiffs were more likely to succeed and in fact 
succeeded more often in covered jurisdictions. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Our studies on section 2 litigation suggest that covered jurisdictions 
indeed “have more voting rights problems” than do non-covered ones.  
Our studies, of course, cannot prove definitively that this is so.  Section 2 
litigation offers a lens through which to examine opportunities for 
minority political participation in covered and non-covered jurisdictions, 
but this lens—as we have repeatedly recognized18—is imperfect.  It 
requires that cases be brought, resources devoted to their prosecution, 
and merits decisions be both reached and published for review.  To the 
extent that any of these factors varied systematically between covered 
and non-covered jurisdictions, a distorted portrait of political 
participation would have emerged from published section 2 decisions.  
Cox and Miles, however, have identified nothing that suggests any such 
distortion.  If anything, a careful examination of votes by individual 
judges reveals section 2 litigation to be a more precise lens through 
which to study minority political participation than even we had 
suspected.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17. See Katz, Mission Accomplished?, supra note 15. 
18. See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 2, at 734; Katz, Not Like 
the South, supra note 3, at 214; Katz, Mission Accomplished?, supra note 15. 
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  APPENDIX  
TABLE 1:  VIOLATION VOTES BY JUDGES’ RACE, PARTY, AND TYPE OF 
JURISDICTION 
  
Covered Non-Covered 
Violations Votes 
Violation 
Rate Violations Votes 
Violation 
Rate 
White* 73 235 31.1% 89 291 30.6% 
African 
American 12 16 75.0% 13 19 68.4% 
Total 85 251 33.9% 102 310 32.9% 
Republican** 38 146 26.0% 44 176 25.0% 
Democrat** 47 105 44.8% 58 134 43.3% 
Total 85 251 33.9% 102 310 32.9% 
* Latino and Asian American included in White total, per Cox-Miles methodology 
** Party refers to the party of the appointing president. 
 
Note 1: Chi-Square value for total votes of African American/White vs. Covered/Non-
Covered was .012 (p = .913) 
Note 2: Chi-Square value for total votes of Republican/Democrat vs. Covered/Non-
Covered was .077 (p=.781) 
 
 
TABLE 1.1:  VIOLATION VOTES BY TRIAL JUDGES’ RACE, PARTY, AND TYPE OF 
JURISDICTION 
  
Covered Non-Covered 
Violations Votes 
Violation 
Rate Violations Votes 
Violation 
Rate 
White* 32 85 37.6% 48 147 32.7% 
African 
American 8 8 100.0% 6 9 66.7% 
Total*** 40 93 43.0% 54 156 34.6% 
Republican** 16 54 29.6% 24 87 27.6% 
Democrat** 24 39 61.5% 30 69 43.5% 
Total*** 40 93 43.0% 54 156 34.6% 
* Latino and Asian American included in White total, per Cox-Miles methodology  
** Party refers to the party of the appointing president.  
*** Total includes all trial judge votes, from solo and three-judge panel trials. 
 
Note 1: Chi-Square value for total votes of African American/White vs. Covered/Non-
Covered was .735 (p = .391) 
Note 2: Chi-Square value for total votes of Republican/Democrat vs. Covered/Non-
Covered was .125 (p=.724) 
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TABLE 2: EFFECT OF TRIAL OUTCOME AND COVERAGE ON APPEAL AND 
REVERSAL RATES (MARGINAL EFFECTS PROBIT) 
Variable 
All Trial-Level Votes 
Appealed Reversed 
Violation Vote = “Yes” 
 
– .190 ** 
(.094) 
.510 ** 
(.123) 
Section 5 Coverage 
 
.028 
(.106) 
.281 ** 
(.130) 
Violation Vote = “Yes”& Section 5 Coverage 
 
–.179 
(.155) 
– .348 ** 
(.056) 
Challenge to At-Large Election 
 
.006 
(.126) 
– .334 ** 
(.133) 
Challenge To Reapportionment Plan 
 
– .003 
(.119) 
.031 
(.147) 
Challenge to Local Election Practice 
 
– .034 
(.093) 
.334 ** 
(.117) 
Plaintiffs were African American 
 
.195 * 
(.111) 
– .124 
(.199) 
Log-Likelihood – 133.213 – 64.051 
Psuedo-R2 .1295 .2131 
* Significant at p < 0.10 
** Significant at p < 0.05 
DV:  Appeals and Reversals 
 
Note:  Reversal Rates are Conditional on Appeals (non-appealed verdicts aren’t included 
as 0’s). 
 
TABLE 3:  VIOLATION VOTES BY LEVEL AND JURISDICTION 
  
Covered Non-Covered 
Violation 
Votes 
Total 
Votes 
Violation 
Rate 
Violation 
Votes 
Total 
Votes 
Violation 
Rate 
Trial 33 75 44.0% 24 75 32.0% 
3-Judge Panel 7 18 38.9% 30 81 37.0% 
Appellate 45 158 28.5% 48 154 31.2% 
Total 85 251 33.9% 102 310 32.9% 
 
Note:  Three-judge panels decided 6 cases in covered jurisdictions and 27 cases in non-
covered jurisdictions. The Chi-square value obtained by comparing convened cases in 
single-judge/three-judge-panel vs. covered/non-covered was 11.1 (p < .001.) 
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